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NOTE
NEW DIRECTION IN SACRED LANDS CLAIMS:
LYNG V NORTHWEST INDIAN CEMETERY
PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION
Public Lands-Free Exercise--American Indians-Sacred Lands

In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,' the
United States Supreme Court considered whether an American Indian
group could successfully challenge plans to build a road and harvest timber
on federally owned lands that are traditional sacred grounds. The Court

found that a federal action may interfere or virtually destroy the Indians'
ability to practice religion so long as it does not affirmatively coerce an
individual into violating his religious beliefs.
FACTS OF THE CASE

Two suits against the United States Forest Service (Forest Service) for
two separate actions within the Blue Creek Unit of the Six Rivers National
Forest were consolidated for trial .2 The first action involved the completion of the final section of a paved road linking the towns of Gasquet and
Orleans, California. In 1977, the Forest Service issued a draft environmental impact statement discussing the proposed routes for the Chimney
Rock Section. 3 Although a report commissioned by the Forest Service
concluded that any road would interfere with Indian religious practices,"
the Regional Forester selected the route that avoided archeological sites
I. 108 S. Ct. 1319, (1988).
2. The two suits alleged identical causes of action. Plaintiffs in the first suit were seven nonprofit corporations and unincorporated associations (Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, Sierra Club, The Wilderness Society, California Trout, Siskiyou Mountains Resource Council, Redwood Region Audubon Society, and the Northcoast Environmental Center), four individuals
of American Indian heritage, and two Sierra Club members. The second suit was brought by the
State of California through the Native American Heritage Commission and Resource Agencies.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 552 F. Supp. 951, 953 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(denying motions for preliminary injunctions), later proceedings, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), withdrawn. reh'g granted,
aff'd on rehearing, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng, 108 S.Ct. 1319 (1988).
3. 795 F.2d at 690.
4. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1322 (citing D. Theodoratus, Cultural Resources of the Chimney Rock
Section, Gasquet-Orleans Road, Six Rivers National Forest (1979), reprinted in Joint Appendix 110,
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988) (No. 86-1013). The
report stated that any of the proposed routes "would cause serious and irreparable damage to the
sacred areas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest
California Indian peoples." Id.
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and was as far removed as possible from sites used for specific spiritual
activities. Routes outside the Chimney Rock area would require acquisition of private land, had soil stability problems, and would still cross

areas of ritualistic value.'
The second action concerned the implementation of a management plan
for the 67,500 acre Blue Creek Unit. Within the Blue Creek unit are a
virgin Douglas Fir forest covering 31,000 acres which had been inventoried as a roadless area, and the "high country" which is considered
sacred by the Yurok, Karok and Tolowa Indians. 6 The final plan called
for the harvesting of timber and the construction of approximately 200
miles of logging roads in the vicinity of Chimney Rock and other religious
sites.7 The Forest Service proposed to leave half-mile protective zones
around identified religious sites where timber harvesting and construction
of roads would be forbidden.'
After exhausting their administrative remedies, plaintiffs filed suit seeking, among other things, a preliminary injunction to prevent construction
of the Chimney Rock Section of the road.' The district court denied the

preliminary injunction, choosing to conduct an early trial on the merits.'"
After trial on the merits, the district court found that the Forest Service
decision violated the First Amendment of the Constitution,"1 several federal environmental acts,' 2 Indian water and fishing rights and the gov5. Id. The Regional Forester considered no construction, three routes within the Blue Creek Unit,
and two established corridors outside of the forest, Factors considered were the proximity to archeological and religious sites, the initial and maintenance costs, slope and soil stability, and the effect
on timber haul costs. The alternative chosen passes through the Helkau District, an area nominated
by the Forest Service for inclusion on the National Register of Historic places because of the
ideological-religious values of the high country. Joint Appendix 100, Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988) (No. 86-1013).
6. Northwest, 565 F. Supp. at 590. A roadless area is an area of undeveloped land where there
are no improved roads which are maintained for use by vehicles intended for highway use. 795 F.2d
at 689 n. I. The high country is in the northeastern comer of the Blue Creek Unit and is considered
sacred by the Yurok, Karok and Tolowa tribes. 565 F Supp. at 591.
7. 565 F. Supp. at 592.
8. Lyng, 108 S, CtL at 1322.
9. Northwest, 552 F.Supp. at 953. Plaintiffs alleged that the decision violated the First Amendment
of the Constitution, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, the National Environmental Policy
Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, the Federal Water Quality Control Act, American Indian
reserved fishing and water rights, the trust responsibility towards American Indians, the Wilderness
Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, the National Forest Management Act of 1976, and the
Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Act. Id.
10. Id. at 954.
1I. 565 F. Supp at 591-97. The First Amendment Free Exercise Clause states that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ..
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. 565 F.Supp. at 591, 598-604 (National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 43214370 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986)); id. at 591,604-05 (Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982
& Supp. IV. 1986)).
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emiment's trust responsibilities to protect those rights, and the Administrative
Procedures Act.' 3 The Forest Service was permanently enjoined from

building the road or harvesting timber in the high country. Because of
deficiencies in the environmental impact statement, the court enjoined
the Forest Service from engaging in commercial timber harvesting and

construction of logging roads in the roadless area until a new or supplemental environmental impact statement adequately evaluated the wilderness resource potential. The Forest Service was further enjoined from
harvesting timber and constructing logging roads anywhere in the Blue
Creek Unit until an adequate environmental impact statement was prepared. 4
The Forest Service appealed." Pending the appeal, the California Wilderness Act of 19846 was passed and signed into federal law. The Act
placed most of the Blue Creek Unit high country in wilderness and out
of reach of timber harvesting 7 but left open a 1200 foot wide corridor
for completion of the road.' On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the road would interfere with
the Indians' free exercise of their religion 9 and that the government failed
to demonstrate a compelling interest in completion of the road.2" The
court also found that the environmental impact statement was inadequate.21
Unable to discern whether the constitutional or the environmental issue
was the basis for the decision below,2" the Supreme Court considered
whether the Indians' First Amendment right to free exercise of their
religion had been violated, remanding the remaining issues to the district
court for consideration of any other relevant events that may have intervened since the injunction was issued."
13. Id. at 605-06 (Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §706 (1982)).
14. Id. at 606.
15. 795 F.2d at 691. Issues considered on appeal were: whether the enjoining of road construction
and timbering on the grounds that these activities would impermissively burden the Indian Plaintiff's
First Amendment right to the free exercise of their religion was proper; whether the road and land
management plans failed to adequately discuss effects on water quality; and whether the proposed
actions would violate the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and state water quality standards. Id.
16. California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 425, 98 Stat. 1619 (codified in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C. (Supp. IV. 1986)).
17. Id. Commercial enterprises, such as timber harvesting, and temporary and permanent roads
are prohibited in wilderness areas. National Wilderness Preservation System, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c)
(1982).
18. Congress did not take any position on whether or not the road should be built. H.R. REP.
No. 40, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1984).
19. 795 F.2d at 693.
20. Id. at 695.
21. Id. at 696-97.
22. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1323 (1988).
23. Id. at 1330.
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The Court concluded that while diminishing the sacredness of an area
and interfering with religious experiences of individuals were burdens on
religious practices, these burdens were not protected by the First Amendment. 24 An unconstitutional burden must affirmatively coerce an individ-

ual into violating his religious beliefs or penalize him for his beliefs. -5
In this case, the Indians were not coerced into acting contrary to26their
religious beliefs and could not claim First Amendment protection.
BACKGROUND

The cases developing and refining the free exercise test, Sherbert v.

Verner,27 Wisconsin v. Yoder2", and Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana
Employment Security Division,29 concern challenges to statutes. In each
situation an individual was faced with the choice of violating his religious
beliefs and either receiving a statutory benefit or violating a law. When
a statute is involved, courts have found that the individual should not be
forced to make a choice that would violate his religious beliefs unless
there is a compelling state interest." In cases relating to the disposition
of sacred lands no statute exists; rather, the challenged action is an internal
decision on the part of a governmental entity which could impede or even
destroy a group's ability to practice their religion. With a government
action, the individual often has no choice but to violate his beliefs.
Lower federal courts have applied the traditional free exercise test to
the small number of cases concerning government actions and traditional
Indian sacred lands. 3 None of these cases were considered in reaching
24. Id. at 1325.
25. Id. at 1325-26.
26. Id. at 1325.
27. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of employment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist discharged
because she would not work on her Sabbath Day).
28. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parents who believed that high school attendance was contrary
to their religion were charged with violating a compulsory school-attendance law).
29. 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (denial of employment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job
because his religious convictions would not allow him to participate in the production of weapons).
30. See, e.g., id. at 717-18, Yodder, 406 U.S. at 214, Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 404-06.
31. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Sequoyah
v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Badoni v.
Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Crow v. Gullet, 541
F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), af'd., 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
These cases and Northwest have been discussed in a number of law review articles. See generally.
Barsh, The Illusion of Religious Freedom For Indigenous Americans, 65 OR. L. REV. 363 (1986);
Higginbotham, Native Americans versus Archaeologists: The Legal Issues, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
9) (1983); Pemberton, "ISaw That It Was Holy": The Black Hills and the Concept of Sacred Land,
3 LAW & EQUITY 287 (1985); Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause-Some Reflections
on Recent Cases, 9 N. Ky. L. REV. 265 (1982); Stambor, Manifest Destiny and American Indian
Religious Freedom: Sequoyah, Badoni, and the Drowned Gods, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 59 (1983);
Comment, Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson: Indian Religious Sites
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the result in Lyng. Instead, the Court chose to follow Bowen v. Roy,32 a
recent free exercise challenge to the government's use of a social security

number.
The Sacred Lands Cases
In the sacred lands cases, the lower courts agreed that the test for a
free exercise violation was a two step procedure. First, the court must
determine whether the government action creates an impermissible burden
on the claimants' exercise of his religion. The second step, which is
reached only if a burden is found, requires the government to establish

an interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection. 33 Some courts have added the condition that the government
interest must be one that could not be accomplished through less restrictive
or alternative means. 4
Courts have differed on what claimants must show to prove a burden.
In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority,35 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined the quality of the claims and
found the plaintiffs had neither alleged nor shown that the sacred lands
were central or indispensable to their religious observances. Therefore,

Prevail Over Public Land Development, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 125 (1986) (authored by Sheri
L. Grohoud, John F Lawlor, Sharon R. O'Keefe, and Kelly D. Talcott); Note, Religion: The First
Amendment and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 151 (1983)
(authored by Robin K. Rannow); Note, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 25 ARIz. L.
REV. 429 (1983) (authored by Ellen M.W. Sewell), Note, Native Americans' Access to Religious
Sites: Underprotected Under the Free Exercise Clause?, 26 B.C.L. REV. 463 (1985); Note, Native
American Free Exercise Rights to the Use of Public Lands, 63 B.UL. REV. 141 (1983) (authored
by Laurie Ensworth); Note, The First Amendment and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act:
An Approach to Protecting Native American Religion 71 IOWA L. REV. 869 (1986) (authored by
Diane Brazen Gould); Note, Religious Freedom and Public Land Use: Wilson v. Block, 20 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 109 (1985) (authored by Richard Schneebeck); Note, American Indian Sacred
Religious Sites and Government Development: A ConventionalAnallysis In an Unconventional Setting.
85 Micr. L. REV. 771 (1987) (authored by Mark S. Cohen); Note, Wilson v. Block, 26 NAT. RES.
J. 169 (1986) (authored by Mary H. Smith); Note, Equality Under the First Amendment: Protecting
Native American Religious Practices on Public Lands, 8 PuB. LAND L. REV. 165 (1987) (authored
by Fred Unmack); Note, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act-An Answer to the Indian's
Prayers?, 29 S.D.L. REV. 131 (1983) (authored by Rex P. Craven); Note, American Indians and
the First Amendment: Site-Specific Religion and Public Land Management, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 673
(authored by James H. Woodall); Note, Indian Worship v. Government Development: A New Breed
of Religion Cases, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 313 (authored by Cynthia Thorley Andreason); Note, Indian
Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of Public Lands, 94 YALE L. J. 1447 (1985)
(authored by Sarah B. Gordon).
32. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
33. Wilson, 708 F2d at 740; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1163; Badoni, 638 F.2d at 176-77; Crow
541 F. Supp. at 790.
34. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740; Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 790.
35. 620 F.2d at 1159.
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the Court reasoned that the plaintiffs had not made a claim of infringement
on a constitutionally protected right.36
To establish a burden, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in Badoni v. Higginson,17 and the United States District Court,
South Dakota in Crow v. Gullet,3" required a coercive effect. Claimants
must either prove that they were injured or penalized because of adherence
to their religious practices or that the exercise of their beliefs was unduly
restricted. 9 The Badoni court further required that the practice infringed
on be based on beliefs that are religious and sincerely held.4'
To demonstrate a burden on a freedom of belief, the court in Wilson
v. Block4 would require a showing that the government has regulated,
prohibited or rewarded a religious belief or that the governmental action
penalized adherence to a religious belief.42 While the governmental action
was inconsistent with the plaintiffs' beliefs and would cause spiritual
disquiet, the court denied that these constitute a free exercise claim.43 To
prevail on a claim of freedom to practice religion, a claim concerning
sacred lands must, at minimum, demonstrate that the proposed government land use would impair a practice that could not be performed elsewhere.' Even then, the proof would not necessarily establish a burden.
36. Id. at 1164-65. Sequoah was a class action suit brought on behalf of the Cherokee Nation
asking for an injunction to prevent the completion and flooding of Tellico Dam. The plaintiffs alleged
that the flooding would cause irreparable injury to sacred homeland along the river, sacred sites,
medicine gathering places and cemeteries; would disturb the sacred balance of the land; and would
cause irreversible loss of culture and history. Id. at 1160.
37. 638 F.2d 172. Badoni concerned an appeal from a summary judgment by Navajo religious
leaders and three Navajo chapters who challenged the government's management of the Rainbow
Bridge National Monument and the Glen Canyon Dam and Reservoir. Plaintiffs had asked for
declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that the government drowned some of their gods, denied
access to a prayer spot, and that by allowing tourists to visit Rainbow Bridge, the government
permitted desecration of a sacred site. Id. at 175-76.
38. 541 F. Supp. 785. In Crow, traditional chiefs and spiritual leaders of the Lakota and Tsistsistas
Nations brought an action concerning Bear Butte, a geological formation at the edge of the Black
Hills. Contending that the Butte is the most powerful ceremonial site for their religious practices,
plaintiffs asked the court to declare their full, unrestricted and uninterupted use of the Butte, which
is now a South Dakota State Park. Plaintiffs further sought to enjoin any alteration of the natural
features and to have the state remove roads, parking lots and buildings currently in place at the park.
Id. at 787-88.
39. Id. at 790. Badoni. 638 F.2d at 176.
40. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 176.
41. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983). Wilson concerned an appeal
by the Hopi and Navajo tribes, the Navajo Medicinemen's Association, and other Navajos from a
summary judgment granted to the Forest Service. Plaintiffs objected to a permit granted a private
interest to expand and develop the government-owned Snow Bowl ski area on the San Francisco
Peaks near Flagstaff, Arizona. The original suit sought to halt further development of the Snow
Bowl and the removal of existing ski facilities. Id. at 738-39.
42. Id. at 741.
43. Id. at 742.
44, Id. at 744.
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Since the plaintiffs had not met the minimum requirements to establish
a burden, the court felt it unnecessary to consider if any additional factors
are necessary to establish a burden. 5
No Indian group was able to establish an impermissible burden until
Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAssociation v. Peterson,' the decision overturned by Lyng. In Northwest, the court used the same two
part test that was used in the earlier sacred lands cases and required that
in order to establish a burden, the area must be indispensable and central
to the practice and beliefs.4 7 Unlike Crow and Wilson, the court did not
require that the government action penalize beliefs or practices. An action
that impedes religious observances or makes exercise more difficult was
enough to hold the action invalid. 8 The court went on to the second step
of the test and found that the government interest in building the road
and harvesting timber fell short of the paramount government interest
necessary to overrule an infringement on free exercise.49

The Roy Decision
In reversing Northwest, the Supreme Court in Lyng relied heavily on
Bowen v. Roy." Roy is particularly instructive because it addresses free
exercise challenges to two separate statutory schemes-one directing an
internal governmental procedure and the other requiring an individual to
comply with a mandatory provision in order to receive a benefit. Stephen
J. Roy applied for welfare benefits but refused to furnish a social security
number for his daughter. Payments were terminated and Roy filed an
action claiming entitlement to an exemption on free exercise grounds."
Roy, an American Indian, testified at trial that he had recently developed
a religious objection to obtaining a social security number for his youngest
daughter. He stated that he believed that control over one's life is essential
to spiritual purity and that technology was "robbing the spirit of man."' 2
Since a social security number is a unique identifier with uses beyond an
individual's control, he testified that he felt that obtaining a number would
rob his daughter of her spirit.' 3 During the trial it was discovered that
45. Id. at 744 n.5.
46. 795 F2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub noa. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Protective Ass'n,
108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
47. Id. at 691-92.
48. Id.at 693.
49. Id. at 694.
50. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
51. ld. at 695.
52. ld. at 696.
53. Id.
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the daughter had already been assigned a social security number. Roy
then testified that it was the use of the number that would rob her spirit.5"
In Roy, the Supreme Court first considered the government's requirement that state agencies use a social security number for record keeping.
Examining the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause,55 the Court stated
that it had never "interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further
his or her spiritual development or that of his or her family." 6 The Court
concluded that free exercise provides protection from governmental compulsion and the agency's use of a social security number was not a
compulsion, as it did not impair Roy's freedom to believe, express, and
exercise religion.57 The result appears to depend, at least in part, on the
fact that the requirement directs governmental rather than individual conduct.5"
On the question of whether the statutory requirement of a social security
number was a burden on free exercise, the Court expressed no opinion.
A majority agreed that there was governmental compulsion or coercion.59
The parents would be forced to chose between "the child's physical
sustenance and the dictates of their faith. "' However, members of the
Court differed significantly on which standard of review to apply in the
second part, or government interest portion of the free exercise test. Chief
Justice Burger, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, 6 found that the
statute requiring a social security number was less intrusive than an
affirmative compulsion or a prohibition. 62 When a facially neutral and
uniform requirement is involved, the government is entitled to wide latitude and the burden is met when the government demonstrates neutral
and uniform application.6 3
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,'M and con54. Id. at 697.
55. See supra, note II.
56. 476 U.S. at 699.
57. Id. at 700.
58. See id.at 701 n.6 ("Roy's religious views may not accept this distinction between individual
and governmental conduct.").
59. Chief Justice Burger states that "we do not believe that no government compulsion is involved,"
Id. at 704. Justice O'Connor does not state a burden was found, but goes on to the second step of
the test, implying a burden exists, Id.at 724 (O'Connor, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Blackmun believes there is coercion. Id. at 713 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part).
Justice White's dissent, based entirely on precedent, implies he would find a burden. Id. at 733
(White, J.,dissenting).
60. id. at 713 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
61. id.at 695.
62. Id. at 704.
63. Id. at 707-08. Chief Justice Burger's use of a rational basis standard in Roy was rejected in
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987).
64. 476 U.S. at 724 (O'Connor, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ditionally by Justice Blackman,65 wrote an opinion dissenting from this
portion of the Chief Justice's opinion. Justice O'Connor would require
that the unbending application of a regulation be essential to the government interest and that the alternative chosen was the least restrictive means
of achieving that interest.' While the government in Roy had met its

burden of showing a compelling interest--the prevention of welfare fraudit failed to show how granting a religious exception would harm this
compelling interest. 7
ANALYSIS

The majority and the dissent in Lyng disagree on the scope of constitutional protection for free exercise." This difference in opinion is reflected in how each applies the first step of the free exercise test. The
Court, by focusing on the nature of the action, limits the kinds of burdens
it will consider as unconstitutional. Applying what it views to be the test
for an unconstitutional burden, the majority then stops because no burden
is found. Justice Brennan, who would look at the effect of the action to
determine a burden, finds an unconstitutional burden and would require
the government to come forward with a compelling state interest sufficient
to justify the infringement.69
The Majority View
The majority was willing to assume that the American Indians' beliefs
are sincere and that the government action would adversely affect their
ability to practice their religion. 7" The role of the court is not to determine
the truth of a claimant's underlying beliefs, and it may not inquire into
the truth, validity, or reasonableness of a claimant's religious belief.7
65. Id. at 716 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part). Justice Blackmun would vacate the lower
court's decision on the second issue and remand for clarification of the record. If it then became
necessary to decide the constitutional issue, he would agree with Justice O'Connor's reasoning. Id.
at 713-15.
66. Id.at 728 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
67. Id.at 732 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988). The majority
opinion was written by Justice O'Connor and joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, Stevens and
Scalia; the dissent by Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Justice Kennedy
took no partin the decision.
69. Id.at 1339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's reliance on the effect has precedents.
See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (the first amendment is offended whether it is
the purpose or the effect of the government action that impedes the religious practice). See also,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
70. Lyng, 108 S.Ct. at 1324.
71. Id.at 1325. "In applying the Free Exercise Clause, courts may not inquire into the truth,
validity, or reasonableness of a claimants religious beliefs." Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 140 n.9 (1987) (summarizing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)).
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their religious
However, the fact that the action would interfere 7with
2
practices is not, in itself, a burden on free exercise.
In analyzing whether there was a burden, the Court in Lyng considered
the challenge to a land management decision to be essentially equivalent
to the challenge to the government's use of the social security number
in Roy." The Court recognized that disruption of the natural environment
would interfere with an individuals religious training and experience.
However, it found that like the government's use of the social security
number in Roy, these incidental effects of government programs which
make their religious practice more difficult are not an unconstitutional
burden because they have no tendency to coerce an individual into acting
contrary to his beliefs. 74 A burden is unconstitutional when the governmental action coerces the parties into violating their religious beliefs;
therefore, the effect on a group's ability to practice their religion is not
relevant to the inquiry.
This result does not necessarily follow from Roy. In Roy the challenge
was to a statute prescribing government conduct, which incidentally affected Roy's beliefs. In Lyng, the Forest Service chose a course of action
it knew would affect the Indians' religious practices." Nor is it clear that
the Roy Court would have disregarded the effect of the action. That Court
found that the objection to the government's use of the social security
number had no merit because such use did not impair the freedom to
believe, express, and exercise.76 In contrast, the Court in Lyng acknowledges that the government action will impair the Indians' ability to practice
and believe.
As the dissent points out, Lyng does not even suggest that the interest
in completing the road is compelling." Instead, the Court seems determined to protect the government interest in managing its property by
refusing to recognize the burden on the Indian's religion as any more
than an "incidental effect of government programs." 78 As the majority
explains, the government simply cannot operate to satisfy the competing
demands of all its citizens, nor is that the job of the Court. Reconciliation
of competing demands is a task for the legislature.' Furthermore, the
Court reasoned, to comply with the requests in Lyng would result in

72. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1325-26.
73. Id. at1325.
74. Id. at 1325-26.
75. Id. at1322.
76. Bowen v.Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700 (1986).
77. Lyng. 108 S.Ct. at1333 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1326.
79. Id. at 1327.
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beneficial ownership by or subsidy of Indian religion and would diminish
the government's property right."0
By defining the test as one of affirmative coercion or compulsion, the
court has significantly narrowed the rights protected by the Free Exercise
Clause. After Lyng, a court will look at the nature of the government
action, which may interfere with, or even destroy the ability to practice
religion as long as there is no penalty or coercion. However, the affirmative coercion test does provide a more objective test for determining a
burden, as a court need not examine the underlying beliefs or determine
the point at which the effect on religious beliefs or practices is too great.
The Dissent
Justice Brennan's view of the protection offered by the Free Exercise
Clause is much broader and he criticizes the majority's approach and
underlying motives." "The constitutional guarantee we interpret today,
however, draws no such fine distinctions between types of restraints on
religious exercise, but rather is directed against any form of governmental
action that frustrates or inhibits religious practice." 82 To Justice Brennan,
"[t]he crucial word in the constitutional text . . . is 'prohibit,' . . . a
comprehensive term that in no way suggests that the intended protection
is aimed only at governmental actions that coerce affirmative conduct." 3
It is the threat to religious freedom, not the form of the threat, which
makes a governmental action unconstitutional."
Instead of an affirmative coercion test, Justice Brennan would have the
Court look at the effect of the action. He would require that an American
Indian group challenging a proposed use of federal land show that the
lands were central or indispensable to their religious practices85 and that
the action "poses a substantial and realistic threat of frustrating their
religious practices."8 6 Such a showing would satisfy the first portion of
the Free Exercise Test and shift the burden to the government to demonstrate a compelling state interest sufficient to justify the infringement
of those practices. 7
Because Justice Brennan finds that the Indians made a showing that
the proposed construction and logging activities would impair their ability
80. id.
8t. Justice Brennan feels that the prime motive of the majority is protection of the government's
prerogative as a landowner. Id. at 1333, 1337 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1335 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1338 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
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to exercise their religion,"5 he is able to proceed to the balancing portion
of the test. He is perhaps too critical of the majority, accusing the court
of disclaiming all responsibility for balancing competing interests. 9 In
Lyng, the majority found no burden and had no reason to balance. When
a burden is found, Justice O'Connor, like Justice Brennan, places a strict
burden on the government to establish an especially important interest,
achieved by narrowly tailored means and which is not possible through
less restrictive means. '
To limit the number of claims relating to public lands, Justice Brennan
suggests a showing that the lands in question were central or indispensable
to a group's religious practices. T Asking an Indian group to prove the
value of the disputed land to their religious practices is more than is
demanded of any other group. This would allow courts to require what
is forbidden of a statute; that is, force a group to choose between providing2
information they may be unwilling to disclose and making their claim.1
CONCLUSIONS
Lyng provides lower courts with considerable direction in deciding
sacred lands claims. First, it instructs courts to forego the kind of speculation about the importance or centrality of the lands, which occupied
much of the Sequoyah9 3 opinion and became a threshold question in
Wilson." It also clarifies the first step of the free exercise test. The sole
inquiry is whether the government action has coerced an individual into
violating his religious beliefs. This action can be an indirect coercion or
a penalty, but must be more than merely making a practice difficult.95
Without coercion, a claimant suffers no unconstitutional burden and thus,
has no free exercise claim.
It is unlikely that challenges to the government decisions concerning
the use of sacred land will succeed under the current test when the Court
finds that the "Constitution simply does not provide a principle"" that
protects against an act that would "virtually destroy the Indians' ability

88. Id. at 1337 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
89. id. at 1338 (Brennan, J._dissenting).
90. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 728 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
91. Lyng. 108 S.Ct. at 1338.
92. See supra note 71. See also Note, American Indian Sacred Religious Sites and Government
Development: A Conventional Analysis In an Unconventional Setting, supra note 31, at 796-99.
93. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953
(1980).

94. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
95. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1326.

96. Id.at 1326-27.
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to practice their religion." 97 In attempting to provide an objective test
that focuses on the nature of a government action, the Supreme Court
has abandoned those groups who, as the result of such action, must violate
their beliefs. The incongruous result is that when the government forces
an individual or group to chose between their beliefs and a benefit, it is
an impermissible burden, yet when the government prevents a practice
and entirely eliminates the element of choice, no burden exists.
An affirmative coercion test also acts to the advantage of a court seeking
to protect the larger government interest, that is, the management of its
internal affairs. When no burden is found, there is no need to scrutinize
the government interest and find that there is a compelling interest pursued
by narrowly tailored means." This result should assure land management
agencies that any action short of an outright prohibition on the use of an
area cannot be successfully challenged.
NANCY AKINS

97. Id. at 1326 (quoting Northwest 795 F.2d at 693).
98. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,728 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).

